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Congress and the executive support the continued development of ballistic missile
defense systems. Since the Bush administration came into office in 2001, the United
States has pulled out ofthe Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and revamped research
and development funding for this defense initiative, asking as much as 9 billion dollars
per year. This thesis analyzes the strategic problems associated with the implementation
ofthese systems and moving the United States from a deterrence-based nuclear posture to
a defense-based one. It concludes with a statistical analysis of factors in each US
Senator's background that might have influenced the probability of their voting against
constraining the program in June 2004 using probit regression methodology.
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INTRODUCTION:
The argument over whether or not the United States should fund, build, and
deploy a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system has been going on for decades.
The change in the distribution of world power caused by the end of the Cold War and
the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union led many to believe that the United States
would be less vulnerable to attack from an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
in the coming decades. Reports like the 1996 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
supported this theory, postulating that the United States would be increasingly less
vulnerable to an ICBM attack as the 90s progressed into the 2000s.1 Such analyses
stated that new types of threats would likely emerge as primary US security concerns,
and that the threat ofa nuclear attack from another state would dwindle as the themes
of globalization, low-intensity conflict and terrorism carried us on into the next
decade. Following this trend, funding for missile defense programs was cut by the
ftrst Bush administration. Even with a relative funding increase in 1997, funding
during the Clinton administration was lower per year than it had been for the entire
Bush administration. The general decreased funding pattern for BMD programs
continued on through the Clinton administration, until in 2000 Clinton decided to
leave the ftnal decision about whether to deploy missile defense programs to his
predecessor.2
1 The General Accounting Office (GAO) corroborated the soundness of 1996 NIE predictions in testimony
to the US Senate Committee on Intelligence in 1996. The release date for the transcript of this testimony
was December 4th, 1996, and a copy is available from the GAO at: <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:ns97053.pdf>
2 Hadley, Stephen J. "A Call to Deploy". The Washington Quarterly. 23:3. pp.95-108
The 2001 ascent ofthe second Bush administration, however, has led to a
dramatic increase in funding for Ballistic Missile Defense programs, as the
administration to date has asked Congress for more funding ($32 billion) for missile
defense development than the Clinton administration did in eight years ($26.7
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The fact that BMD has received large amounts of funding over the past
2
several years means that key congressional members on Capitol Hill agree that BMD
programs are a good use oftaxpayer dollars. Understanding what has led to the
congressional determination that BMD programs are valuable, however, is the
'I
3 As reported by Boese, Wade. "U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance". Arms Control Today:
August 2004
4 US Government: Missile Defense Agency. MDA Online. 20 Oct. 2005.
<http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdflhistfunds.pdf>
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purpose ofthis thesis. To this end, we will look at a series of Senate votes in 2004
and statistically analyze them controlling for the ideological rankings and special-
interest factors that are part of each senator's profile.
Is recent support for BMD programs driven by strategic need, or is it simply a
massive pork-barrel program designed to bring jobs and prime defense contracts
home to Senators' states? How much do factors like the amount ofmilitary personnel
in a Senators' state or their membership on select defense committees affect the
probability that they will vote to support or expand existing missile defense
programs? The following sections ofthis paper will provide the background,
methodology, and tools used in attempting to answer these "questions.
Section II: Historical Background, will set the context for the vote analyses.
Here we will define the strategic concepts ofdefense and deterrence, and outline the
major strategic arguments for and against missile defense systems in both the Cold
War and post-Cold War eras. Also included in this section is a survey ofthe
historical information and strategic arguments that comprise the debate about missile
defense programs today, and this background will propel us into the formation and
execution ofa quantitative statistical models to study these effects. This segment
concludes with a synopsis of several empirical economics papers, highlighting the
sections in each study that will later become components ofthe statistical model
herein.
Section III: Research Design, describes the general theory behind regression
analysis and the reasons why the Linear Probability Model (LPM) is not the best
choice for our purposes. The logit and probit models are introduced, and several
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equations are presented to show the reader the underlying concept of the probit model
and to address the way that unit-changes in the probit regressions will be derived and
interpreted. This leads us into the next section, which primarily deals with the data
we will use in our experiments.
Section IV: Data, outlines the variables that we use in our fmal regressions.
The qualitative variables are three senate votes which have been translated into 0,1
dummy variables for the ease ofcalculation, and a context for each vote is provided
along with its introduction. The quantitative variables are also described, and the
fmal justifications for their inclusion and the sources they are derived from is laid out
for the reader.
Section IV: Empirical Models, is a short section that formally puts the
variables described in section three into theoretical equation form. This transitions us
to the actual implementation of the regressions in section V.
Section V: Results, contains the results of six derivative-probit form equations
(two for each ofthe three 2004 votes) run using Stata Version 8 statistical software.
The important and insignificant variables are cited for each equation, and these results,
are interpreted within the context of each ofthe actual votes.
Section VI: Conclusion, brings the findings in section V back to the original
question of the thesis, determining whether our regression results support or detract
from theories about the factors currently contributing to congressional support of
missile defense programs. An analysis ofvoting patterns for three BMD votes in the
u.s. Senate unearthed some significant positive relationship between membership in
the Senate Armed Services Committee and a tendency to vote pro-BMD. Because the
--------L
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second and third votes seemed to be competing partisan responses the outcome of the
fITst vote, Senate Vote 124 appears to be the only vote which unearths some general
trends in voting behavior, aside from partisanship. Section VI then offers suggestions
for possible statistical remodeling using a larger n vote sample and also using house
votes instead of senate votes, but also notes reasons why this type of quantitative
analysis may not be the best way to unearth correlations between voting outcomes
and factors like the amount of BMD prime contracts that are committed to a state.
Section VI ends by offering ways this study might be further expanded and
differently modeled for future, further investigation ofBMD program support
patterns.
II. HISTORICAL AND STRATEGIC BACKGROUND:
Before delving into the specifics ofmissile threat strategy that provide the
background for this thesis, it is important to clarify a few key terms. Deterrence is a
strategy where one gains security through conveying a credible threat to potential
enemies that an attack will be met with a devastating response-a response so
overwhelming that an enemy is dissuaded from attacking in the first place. Defense is
the ability to counter an enemy attack while it is being inflicted, a strategy which
makes security contingent upon one's immediate response to the attacker while they
are attacking.
To understand the strategic debate about BMD systems, we must understand
the key theoretical differences between deterrence and defense. Imagine, for
example, a city simply named "AB". City AB is divided into two parts, A and B,
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where each half of the city is geographically 50 miles apart. Each half enjoys
communication and interaction with its other half, but the sections ofthe city are too
far apart to be united by any common troop presence or military power linking them.
For the sake of illustration, let's also say that both sections A and B are surrounded
by enemy territory. Now imagine that half A houses an armory, a barracks and a
large company of soldiers, and that the entire halfofthe city is surrounded by a moat
and high exterior walls. Half B, on the other hand, is comprised only ofcivilians with
no military experience, and it has no moat, walls, or armaments like its counterpart
does.
Though both A and B are surrounded by enemy territory, and B has no
military power on site, and the enemy in the neighboring territory has military might
that could attack and overwhelm B, neither city half is attacked by the enemy. Given
the apparent weakness ofB, how could this be possible? In this simple example, the
answer illuminates both deterrence and defense as useful security concepts. Outside
forces do not attack A because they have calculated that A's defenses-the moat and
large wall-are so robust that the enemy could not successfully wage an attack on
half A. City AB's security strategy to protect section A is defense, in that it has built
a response to a foreseeable attack from the outside that would render an attack from
the enemy territories useless.
Outside forces do not attack half B because they are "deterred". The enemy
may know that they are stronger than B, and that they could effectively take over that
section of the city. If section B were attacked, however, section A would retaliate-
sending their troops and technology to inflict a devastating blow against the attackers,
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who would ultimately loose in such a conflict. Because the enemy is assured of a
loss, they decide that any attack on B would be fruitless. Thus A gains its security
from defense, while B gains its security from deterrence.
As a final point ofterminological clarification before we embark on the rest of
our strategic and historic survey, we should distinguish "Theater Missile Defense"
(TMD) systems from ''National Missile Defense" (NMD) systems. Theater missile
defense systems describe missile intercept programs designed to prevent an enemy
from launching a short or long-range missile (not ICBMs) from hitting strategic
regional or battlefield areas. While such capabilities might have specific uses in war
fighting, there are potential concerns about the way these capabilities could affect US
strategic relationships in the global security context.
One variety ofa TMD system focuses on the boost-phase of missile launch.
Boost-phase TMD systems are mobile and not likely based on the US mainland.
These are very short range and require military planners and policymakers to identity
a state as a potential enemy so that their launches can be intercepted very quickly.
NMD systems, on the other hand, are designed to protect the entire US homeland
from enemy launches. NMD systems mayor may not include TMD systems as part
of the strategy for intercepting ICBMs, but the objective is to be able to reliably
intercept an ICBM from any country that launches at the territorial US. The term
BMD refers to both NMD and TMD systems, as part ofthe overall strategy of
intercepting enemy missiles and shifting from a deterrence strategic doctrine to a
defensive one.
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BMD programs have received so much attention over the last half-century
because they offer a strategic choice-is the United States more secure ifwe choose a
doctrine ofdeterrence, or defense? The familiar term Mutually Assured Destruction
(MAD) was fIrst coined by Secretary ofDefense Robert McNamara in the early
1960's to sum up the deterrence security-based relationship between the world's two
superpowers: The United States and the United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR).
As the Cold War marched on, each nuclear power had developed weapons so terrible
and so numerous that either could have launched a nuclear war that could have killed
millions-perhaps even annihilating the human race. Deterrence philosophy ruled
the day. There was nothing that the United States could have done to prevent Soviet
missiles from hitting US soil once the USSR decided to launch an attack against the
United States, but the United States in turn had the credible threat that if the Soviet
Union were to bomb New York, Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, the United
States would devastate Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Novgorod. The consequences of
US retaliation to a USSR attack would be so devastating that seriously engaging the
US in a nuclear conflict was almost unimaginable to Soviet leadership, and vice
versa.S
Events like the Soviet launch ofthe Sputnik satellite and the proliferation of
missiles after World War II instilled fear in many Americans, who were fIlled with
horror at the thought ofa Soviet satellite nightly passing over the US homeland.6 The
5 As argued by Kenneth Waltz in The Spread ofNuclear Weapons. pp. 3-45 New York: Norton, 2003
6 Yenne, Bill. Secret Weapons ofthe Cold War: From the H-Bomb to sm. Pp.140-142. New York:
Penguin, 2005.
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lack ofUS defense against a USSR missile launch left many citizens feeling like
nuclear war could come at any time.
However, some academics argue that the nuclear age was a security paradigm
unlike any other, and that nuclear weapons (when used responsibly) are essentially
peace-causing.? These scholars argue that nuclear weapons offered human
civilization, for the first time, a security environment where a state could feel more
secure than in the past because the outcome of large-scale confrontation was
predictable. The possible repercussions ofa state action were completely
unambiguous, and arguably this led to a more stable security environment.8 Conquest
or large-scale war between either superpower would be absolutely and inarguably
foolish, because each state could clearly see that the outcome ofany such conflict,
once initiated, was absolute destruction. Winning was not possible in a deterrence-
based Cold War world, and everybody knew it.
Missile defense research was begun in order to counter the fear that deterrence
was a potentially volatile security doctrine, the argument being that the US should not
base its security strategy on the whims ofanother nuclear power like the Soviet
Union. To this day, supporters ofBMD want to develop a system of intercepts that
could counter any missile launch from a neighboring country, enabling the US to
shoot out ofthe sky any warhead headed for our homeland territory or larger sphere
of influence-although the current discussion includes the idea of a "limited" BMD
system that would not be expected to counter enemy missiles with 100% reliability.
7 Waltz, ibid.
8 As described by Van Evera, Stephen. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. pp. 140-153.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999.
I
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As President Bush said in an April 28th, 2005 press conference: "One of the reasons
why I thought it was important to have a missile defense system is for precisely the
reason that you brought up, that perhaps Kim long-il has got the capacity to launch a
weapon, and wouldn't it be nice to be able to shoot it down.,,9
Before we continue, it should be noted that authors like Van Evera take the
opposite view on the question ofwhether a defense or deterrence-based world is a
more volatile security environment. Van Evera argues that war is more likely when
conquest appears easy-the corollary also being that war should seem less likely in a
deterrence-based security structure where "winning" is virtually impossible. Closely
related is the idea that deterrence-based security frameworks also clarify security
situations by allowing all players a vision of the same endgame (nuclear annihilation),
while defense-based frameworks may cause war to seem more reasonable because an
unsure outcome means that there is some chance an aggressive state could win.
Waltz joins Van Evera in pointing out that nuclear weapons make war calculations
clearer than at any other time in human history, arguing that war is less likely when
the outcome is easy to determine, as states are less likely to fall prey to engaging in
wars of false optimism. 10 From this vantage point, then, the position that shifting
from nuclear deterrence to the old rules ofoffense and defense would make the
United States less subject to potential enemy ''whims'' does not make a great deal of
sense. One wishing to reduce the likelihood that a state would irrationally launch a
nuclear weapon at the United States should also want to reduce the likelihood that a
9 Bush, George W. Press Conference ofthe President: April 281h, 2005. The White House; Office of the
Press Secretary. <www.whitehouse.gov>
10 Waltz: 9. Van Evera: 14-34.
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state could calculate any potential advantage from missile launch. Attacks based on
false optimism would be more likely to occur in a defense-based security
environment rather than a deterrence based one, because winning is only a possibility
(however slim) in the latter situation.
The pursuit of measures that could counter the national security threat posed
by the existence of ballistic missiles began during the Eisenhower administration,
when President Eisenhower authorized development of the Nike-Zeus nuclear-tipped
interceptor missile and supported Project Defender, a program to develop the
apparatuses for a NMD system. 11 The search for a NMD system was furthered during
President Richard Nixon's tenure, when the Russian development ofan Anti Ballistic
Missile (ABM) system around Moscow triggered his approval ofdeployment ofthe
US "Safeguard" ABM system. The US Safeguard ABM system was plagued by
concerns about its effectiveness and strategic vulnerability by both elected officials
and those in the defense establishment. The system, however, was ultimately
influenced by diplomatic as well as technical and political factors. It was finally
approved to ensure that the US would not be in a weaker, NMD-Iess negotiating
position during Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the early 70's.
1972 was an important year in the history ofNMD programs, as the USSR and
the United States announced successful negotiations of the SALT I Treaty and
included the linked and vital ABM Treaty. In the ABM Treaty, both states agreed
"that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would lead to a
11 Cirincione, Joseph. "BriefHistory of Ballistic Missile Defense and Current Programs in the United




decrease in the risk ofoutbreak ofwar involving nuclear weapons." 12 This was
because both the US and USSR agreed that the deterrence-based security framework
between them was safer and more stable than a defense-based system would be.
It is important to note that these treaties were attained because both US and
Russian negotiators believed that the continued development ofballistic missile
defenses would lead to even greater arms racing between the two superpowers.
Negotiators on both sides knew that the easiest and cheapest way to overcome
another state's NMD system would be to simply build more missiles than the
defending country had interceptors for. While the ABM Treaty's main objective was
to prevent either the US or the USSR from deploying a NMD system over its
territory, the treaty did permit each state to pursue limited deployment ofa partial
NMD system designed to defend a specific city and TMD to intercept short or
medium-range ballistic missiles, but not ICBMs.
During the Ford Administration, military advisors and civilian government
officials determined that the types of missile defenses allowable under the ABM
treaty were too attack-vulnerable to be worth maintaining. The Safeguard system,
while legal under the ABM treaty, had a strategic flaw in that it was dependent on
ground-based radar centers that could easily have been targeted by the Soviet military
in a nuclear offensive. In addition, maintenance of Safeguard was extremely
expensive. Ultimately, the system operated for only a few months before being shut
12 The full text of the ABM Treaty is available at:
<http://www.state.gov/www/globallarms/treaties/abmpage.html>
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down and discarded forever, cancelled because of its ineffectiveness and huge
operational costs. 13
NMD research continued under the Carter Administration, at a cost to taxpayers
ofjust under $1 billion a year. The research which grew under the Carter
administration continued on into the Reagan Administration, and from the outset of
the Reagan Administration there seemed to be an agreement within the US defense
community that national Ballistic Missile Defense, even if desirable, was not
technologically feasible.
Nevertheless, several NMD programs were flirted with early in the Reagan
administration, despite general lack of support from Defense Department officials.
One such program was "High Frontier", proposed to the Reagan Administration by
retired General Daniel Graham. High Frontier was an ambitious program where a
network ofhundreds of rocket-interceptor carrying satellites would circle the earth
and shoot down any missiles launched by a Soviet offensive. The High Frontier
Program was coldly received by the US defense community at multiple levels of
bureaucracy, all the way up to Reagan's Secretary ofDefense Casper Weinberger. A
second NMD program using space-based lasers was also presented around the same
time despite the testimony ofexpert panels such as the Department ofDefense's
Science Board, which unanimously concluded that: "It is too soon to attempt to
accelerate space-based laser development towards integrated space demonstration for
any mission, particularly ballistic missile defense.,,14
13 Cirincione, ibid. pg. 6
14 Ulsamer, Edgar. "The Long Leap Toward Space Laser Weapons," Air Force, pg.2. August 1981.
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On March 23, 1983, President Reagan gave a speech that brought the issue of
BMD into the public spotlight as never before. That night the President spoke to the
US public, noting how desirable it would be if national security were not subject to
deterrence and thus the whims of the Soviet Union, and calling upon scientists to take
up the cause ofNMD in the interest of furthering national security and reducing the
threat ofnuclear weapons. IS BMD development and research during the Reagan
Administration was done under the umbrella of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)
program, which integrated Research and Development (R&D) across the different
armed forces interests in the Defense Department which contributed to the program.
Ballistic Missile Defense programs and SDI were downgraded under the George
H.W. Bush Administration, and were only partially funded but not entirely killed
under the Clinton Administration. Apparently believing that it was impossible to
realize Reagan's attempts to make nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete" with the
SDI program, George W. Bush told the New York Times during his fIrst presidential
run that "SDI was very expensive and had technological problems.,,16 He then
proceeded to cut the BMD budget by 1 billion dollars, a number which was increased
even further by congress. However, perhaps because those in Washington hoped to
continue BMD research so that it might someday yield some offensive capabilities,
the program did not entirely "die" under either administration. Making the argument
that maintaining some form ofthe program could only be useful for offense is rather
15 Reagan, Ronald. "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security". March 23, 1983. Full text
available through the Reagan Presidential Library at:
<http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>
16"TheStarWarsMess". The New York Times. 04 Feb. 1990.
< http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9COCE3DB173FF937A35751 COA966958260>
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easy, since the idea ofa full and working missile defense program that would get the
us out ofdeterrence-based strategic framework seemed to have been abandoned. In
any case, each program could only pursue "limited" capabilities that by defInition ran
contrary to the program's original defensive rhetoric. The Clinton and H.W. Bush
Administrations, however, were careful to keep NMD programs within the terms laid
out by the ABM treaty, politically maneuvering a rhetorical distinction between
Theater Missile Defense systems and National Missile Defense Systems so that
research could continue under the ABM treaty unbrella.
The current Bush Administration has arguably taken one of the largest
policy shifts since the NMD question has been debated, pursuing multi-layered NMD
systems which include NMD and TMD components designed to counter long, short,
and medium-range warheads, and withdrawing from the ABM treaty.
As shown earlier by Figure 1.1, the 2002 fIscal year marks a sharp rise in the
amount ofmissile defense funding requested by the executive branch. The fact that
these Bush Administration requests have been met almost one for one with
congressional appropriations mean that the last several years have produced a marked
expansion in missile defense programs, which has renewed the national debate about
the strategic desirability and technical feasibility ofthese programs.
The technical issues surrounding NMD development have not yet been resolved,
and though the Bush plan calls for ground, sea, and air-based defense systems, only
the ground systems have been tested by the military at al1. l7 The ground, sea, and air-
based systems are meant to intercept ICBMs in any oftheir three phases of flight: The




"boost phase" that occurs from launch to the missile's ascent into earth's atmosphere,
the "midcourse phase (mid-phase)" that consists of atmospheric entry until
atmospheric exit, and the "terminal phase", comprised of the missile's exit from the
atmosphere and the final descent to its target.1S This layered approach means that the
military is responsible for integrating efforts of the Army, Air Force, Joint Staff, and
Missile Defense Agency components. 19 While a thorough analysis ofthe technical
problems with intercepting a missile at each respective phase is beyond the scope of
this thesis, program reviews in 199820 and 200221 reveal that technical questions are
still large. Along these lines, a 2004 GAO report states that "the performance of the
[Missile Defense Agency's] system remains uncertain and unverified.,,22
There are also several strategic problems with BMD systems. The first is that
BMD systems are incredibly expensive to build but are potentially easily
overridden-this concern has existed for decades, as reflected by the ABM treaty
agreement. Let's look at an example. Suppose two nuclear states, X and Y, interact
with one another after X acquires some BMD capability. Let's say that country X has
20 hit-to-kill anti-ballistic missiles which could nullify missiles fired offensively by
country Y. Country Y's counter strategy to this, however, would be to simply build
40 offensive missiles, so that if even country A responded with anti-ballistic missiles
i8 "BMD Basics". Department of Defense: Missile Defense Agency.
<http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/basics.html>
19 Boese, Wade. "Missile Defense Funding Trimmed." Apr. 2005.
<www.arrnscontrol.org/act/2005_03/MissileDefense.asp?print> Mar. 2005
20 United States General Accounting Office. "Even With Increased Funding Technical and Schedule Risks
are High." GA 1.l3:NSIAD-98-135. June 1998.
21 United States General Accounting Office. "Review of Allegations About an Early National Missile
Defense Flight Test." GA 1.l3:GAO-02-125. February 2002.
22 United States General Accounting Office. "Defense Acquisitions: Status of Ballistic Missile Defense
Program in 2004." GA 1.l3:GAO-05-243 March 2005.
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at 100% hit-to-kill accuracy, country Y's 20 extra missiles would do horrendous
damage. Country X, then, might build 40 anti-ballistic missile missiles, to counter
Y's 40 offensive missiles and once again reestablish a credible anti-missile line of
defense. Y could then build more missiles at a much lower cost, and so on and so
forth.
This scenario represents two ofthe primary concerns about the strategic
effectiveness of a BMD system, even if the government could develop reliable
technology to accomplish the difficult task ofhitting an enemy warhead. The first
concern is that however technically effective our system ultimately is, an enemy state
could always defeat a BMD shield through engaging in arms racing. As far back as
the ABM treaty (which will be covered in the Historical Background section ofthis
prospectus), concerns have existed about NMD's potential to create arms racing
because all a state would have to do in order to defeat a missile "defense" shield
would be to lob more missiles than the shield has interceptors for.
The second strategic concern illustrated by the scenario above is financial.
Building more missiles is relatively cheap, while NMD research has already proven
to be a phenomenally expensive program. If states built up arsenals in order to
overcome a US NMD system, the United States would have to match that
proliferation with a proliferation of interceptors, putting the United States in a bizarre
security situation where we had chosen a policy that was cheap for other states to
overcome and incredibly expensive for us to expand in response. This occurs because
AMBs are relatively "smart" and much more expensive to build, while ICBMs are
technologically much "dumber". According to the CBO report, a low estimate for the
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cost ofone interceptor is $25,000,000,23 while globalsecurity.com estimates that the
cost to produce a Minuteman III ICBM is about $7,000,000.24 Estimates like this
mean that defense would be as more than 3x as expensive for the US as offensive
would be for its potential enemies, and this calculation was arrived at using the
cheapest option for interceptor cost that the CBO considered and an advanced US
missile as an ICBM example. It is very conceivable than reasonable scenarios using
higher estimates for ABMs and cheaper examples ofICBMs would yield an even
larger spending discrepancy.
Such an asymmetrical military spending scenario may be unwise to
voluntarily embark on, even given the present wealth ofthe US economy. Ifthe
economy crashed or if for some reason the government let the working NMD system
lapse, the US would arguably be in the same security situation it is presently in except
worsened, because the United States would have further inflamed the international
community by having pursued a seemingly unilateralist policy and undermined
credibility we may have had as a militarily restrained state.
Finally, it seems unlikely that the post-9fll global threats the United States
will be facing are going to come from ICBMs. Instead, cruise missiles are perhaps
the biggest threat. Cruise missiles, which are GPS guided and fly at slower speeds
about 50 feet above the ground, are undetectable by most forms of radar and therefore
23 Congressional Budget Organization. Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense. July 2004. 05 May
2006. Appendix, 9. <http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfin?index=5679&sequence=6>
24 Air Force Link: Official Website of the United States Air Force. "LGM-30 Minuteman III." 05 May
2006. <http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=113>
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could not be countered by a NMD system.25 Cruise missiles are also much cheaper,
and could be launched offa boat just offshore from the US mainland without giving
off the telltale heat signature that would let existing US systems know where an
ICBM was launched from. This more clandestine type of launch seems like it would
be much more appealing to terrorist organizations or states hoping to get away with
attacking the US without retaliation.
While the administration has been a vocal supporter and catalyst for
revamping BMD spending, many top military officials have lent support for BMD
that is lukewarm at best. Lt. General Jay Montgomery Garner told Washington Post
reporter George C. Wilson in 1997 that "there is no mechanism in place to make
agencies like...Ballistic Missile Defense Organization [now MDA] efficient. They
just pass on their inefficiencies on to the armed services and we have to pay for them.
If! couldn't eliminate them, I would at least put them on an operating account where
they had to give so much service for a fixed amount ofmoney.,,26
Given a recent New York Times article by William Broad, General Garner's
observations regarding lack ofaccountability for the BMD program seem to show
some greatness ofmind.27 Broad's article reports that Subrata Ghoshroy, a senior
GAO investigator assigned to look into one ofthe primary technical components of
the BMD system, accused the GAO of falsely informing Congress and the public in a
2002 report on the status ofthe BMD project and covering up information and
25 Southworth, Samuel A. u.S. Anned Forces Arsenal: A Guide to Modem Combat Hardware. pp.60-65.
Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2004.
26 Wilson, George C. This War Really Matters. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000. 55.
27 Broad, William J. "Accountability Office Finds Itself Accused." The New York Times. 02 April 2006.
Al8.
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disturbing test results that would have looked unfavorable to the project. Broad
quotes Ghoshroy as saying that he found it "totally amazing" that the G.A.O. refused
to admit that its report misinformed Congress and the public and that he was
"concerned that there's no one out there to oversee the overseer."
During the same round of interviews with George Wilson, General
Shalikashvili, Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff, also told Mr. Wilson that "to
decide to deploy a missile defense before the technology is proved effective 'seems to
me to be less than a prudent way to go. Find out that it works before deciding to
deploy. ",28
Around the same time as the Shalikashvili interview, Congressman Obey (D-
WI) also gave Wilson his own opinions about the missile defense programs.29 Obey
served as the chairman ofthe House Appropriations Committee in 1994, and was a
key player in "top budget negotiations". Having served in Congress from 1969 and
been the overseer ofmany congressional budgets, Obey had firm views about what
the US military needed to best respond to the threats the nation would face in the
years ahead.
In his interview with Congressman Obey, Wilson asks: "Is the case for a
missile defense stronger in the twenty-first century than it was in the twentieth
century when the United States decided to forgo deploying a missile defense even
though the Soviet Union had thousands ofnuclear warheads aimed at us?"
'I don't think it is,' Obey replied. 'But the argument the [Star Wars]




terrorist countries are more likely to behave irrationally. The argument is persuasive
enough to people to resurrect this stuff. Let's grant their premise. There is no
evidence to indicate that you can afford to put an additional dime in that program
right now because it has not progressed far enough technically...For those systems to
work, everything has to work the first time and it will never have been tested in
battlefield conditions. '
Here Congressman Obey echoes two concerns about the viability ofthe BMD
program that mirror many ofthose same questions that plagued Reagan's Star Wars
system in its day. For those proponents who believe that defense rather than
deterrence would lead to a greater security paradigm, a NMD system would have to
work 100% ofthe time to get the US out ofa deterrence-based nuclear posture, and
even ifthe technology could work it will have never been tested in battlefield
conditions, making it difficult to rely on in wartime.
Contrapuntally, however, former Defense Secretary William Cohen supported
the late-l 990s/early 2000s drive towards BMD development. Though a long-time
supporter ofdeterrence and US-Soviet arms control agreements, Cohen saw the drive
towards BMD deployment as something that was inevitable and not necessarily
mutually-exclusive with deterrence. Wilson asked Cohen whether he thought that the
US "should deploy a missile defense in the new century," and Cohen responded by
saying,
Given the nature of the technology that is being spread around the globe I
don't see how we can avoid it. For me the question is: Is it there yet? Will it be there
by next year? We're going to see the threat increase. We cannot protect against an
all-out Russian assault as such, and that's where our deterrent comes into play. But if
you have a NorthKorea that has nothing to lose, and in a moment of madness
unleashes one ofthe Tae-po Dong 2's or 3's, should they have them, with a chemical
or biological warhead, you need some kind ofmissile defense to stop it. You say,
'wait a minute. The Chiefs are concerned about a suitcase bomb filled with bio or
"'
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chemical. Or a tourist puts it out [UDSuspectingly brings in a terrorist suitcase bomb.
They say that's the more likely threat we face.' And it is.3o
Despite this, Cohen believes that a missile defense against Cold War
enemies warranted an entirely different strategy than that which applies to our day
and age. He acknowledges that while BMD is not the only place where defense
spending should go, it is a program that can and should be supported at some level
because of its strategic usefulness. Later in the interview, he offers an articulate
summary ofwhat will later become the Bush Administration's main argument, that
the end of the Cold War and rise in Rogue State threats has created a new national
security paradigm where BMD should have a place in state security strategy. Former
Secretary Cohen continues:
From an ICBM threat you have a strong deterrent. That's not going to go
away. Any country that would think of letting loose an ICBM on the United States
will be vanquished in the process. There may be some countries who say we have
nothing left to lose. You may have a situation where Saddam Hussein says don't
even think about your containment policy because you never know that in a moment I
might unleash one [a biological or chemical missile] in downtown New York or
Washington or Detroit or wherever it might be. So you want to have something that
would give you protection against that kind ofthreat. And that's something I've
always supported.
Similar themes can be found in the Bush Administration's most recent
executive document, entitled "The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America.,,31 Section five of this text focuses on protecting the US and its friends and
allies from threats ofweapons ofmass destruction. The primary reference to BMD in
the policy reads:
30 Ibid., 176-177.
31 The United States of America: National Security Council. The National Security Strategy of the United
States of America. Feb 29 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss5.html>
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We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are
able to threaten or use weapons ofmass destruction against the United States and our
allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances,
the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use
ofmilitary forces, modem technologies, including the development ofan effective
missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and
analysis.
Again, the political rhetoric emphasizes rogue states and terrorists obtaining
weapons ofmass destruction. Given the amount oftechnology and all of the cheaper
alternatives available, it is probably rather unlikely that a terrorist state would design
an offense around an ICBM attack on US soil, but it is important to note that the
administration's rhetoric also warns ofthe special circumstances that "rogue states"
might carry, marking them as different from the Soviets who were the enemy during
the Star Wars era. A 2001 unclassified summary of a National Intelligence Estimate,
however, supports the contrary idea that enemy states wanting to seriously harm the
US or its interests would be unlikely to choose the comparatively expensive ICBM
option.32 The report states that:
Several countries could develop a mechanism to launch SRBMs, MRBMs, or land-
attack cruise missiles from forward-based ships or other platforms; a few are likely to
do so-more likely for cruise missiles-before 2015. Nonmissile means for
delivering weapons ofmass destruction do not provide the same prestige, deterrence,
and coercive diplomacy as ICBMs; but they are less expensive, more reliable and
accurate, more effective for disseminating biological warfare agents, can be used
without attribution, and would avoid missile defenses.
32 Director of Central Intelligence. "Unclassified summary ofa National Intelligence Estimate: Foreign
Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat through 2015". National IntelligenceCouncil.
December 2001. 05 May 2006. <http://www.fas.org/irp/nic/bmthreat-2015.htm> (italics added)
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Stephen J. Hadley, former Deputy National Security Advisor under
Condoleezza Rice and the current National Security Advisor, has written articles in
favor ofboth NMD and TMD systems that predate any ofhis administration
appointments. In a somewhat disorganized attack on the Clinton administration's
support ofthe limited system in Alaska, Hadley writes that,
The system proposed by the Clinton administration would involve up to only 100
land-based interceptors located at a single site in Alaska. This system is intended to
provide a very limited defense capable of shooting down 10 to 20 ballistic missile
warheads launched at the United States, primarily from North Korea. Such a system
would do nothing about the thousands ofstrategic ballistic missile warheads still
deployed by Russia and relatively little about ballistic missiles that might be launched
at the United States from countries such as Iraq and Iran in the Middle East.. .33
Hadley then goes on to cite a 1999 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that
warns ofpossible ICBM threats from North Korea, Iraq and Iran through nuclear
development programs, illegal arms trading, or both.34 His citations from the NIE
thus speak to his claims that a limited missile system in Alaska would not adequately
protect the US against the "rogue" threats he perceives from Iraq and Iran, but they do
nothing to help his assertion that the Clinton administration was failing in its national
security imperative because the US was not developing a NMD system capable of
countering thousands of Soviet warheads.
Later in the piece he attempts to assuage critics by saying that an "emergency,
limited" capability would not violate the spirit of the ABM treaty because that would
not be designed to counter the Soviet threat.35 Thus he simultaneously criticizes late
90's BMD efforts for not aiming at the development of full NMD defenses, and
33 Hadley, Stephen J. The Washington Quarterly. 23:3.95-108. (last set of italics added)
34 "Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015."
United States: National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs. (Sept. 1999).
35 Hadley, 102.
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assuages readers by telling them that what he proposes is not actually NMD and thus
critics should not be up in arms about the strategic consequences ofBMD policies.
Finally, Hadley changes direction once again and again proposes NMD as part of
BMD development, suggesting that we should pacify Russian resentment about the
US not being subject to their deterrent by partnering with them to develop TMD
systems and then jointly exporting the technology for profit.36 While Cohen's
arguments seem well thought out and strategically sound whether or not one agrees
with his assessment ofthe world security situation, Hadley's Washington Quarterly
piece seems to lack an similar apparent framework for articulating BMD's place in a
global security context, despite his long national security resume.
So given the dramatic increase in funding and support for BMD programs in
recent years, what has fueled the revamping ofthis old idea? While technology has
improved in recent years, the GAO and CBO reports cited earlier have been critical of
overzealous proclamations about the success ofBMD prototype components, warning
that the costs and risks of the program failing are still very high. Many ofthe old
strategic arguments from the Star Wars days still apply, and legislators like Obey see
many similarities between the arguments in the 80' s and our arguments in the 21 st
century. On the other hand, professionals like Cohen and Hadley view the post-Cold
War age as a different security paradigm for a variety ofreasons, and have many
responses for why BMD will be necessary as we move into the next century. Finally,
many defense department officials seem unsupportive or at least unenthusiastic about
the program, reminding us that such large sums ofmoney could be funding many
36 Ibid., 107.
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other principal sources ofmilitary need, and that deployment before operational
readiness may not be the best way to proceed with weapons system development.
To try to get a more accurate look at what has truly been fueling BMD support
since 2001, we put several 2004 Senate votes into a statistical model that controls for
special-interest variables like prime-contract awards and the amount ofpeople
employed by the DOD in a given state (militarization). We will also try to include
variables that test for a causality between the ways that Senators ideologically tend to
vote and their associations with each other on things like Senate committees. The
following empirical papers help us develop this exact model, and provide the context
for the Research Methods we will describe in Section III ofthis thesis.
Our model for determining the probability ofvoting outcomes as a function of
multiple explanatory variables was inspired by voting behavior analyses in several
empirical papers. John Wright ofOhio State University uses a probit method to
predict the probability ofpro-tobacco votes in the House and Senate given party
affiliation, ideology, tobacco production, tobacco employment, and campaign
contributions from sixteen tobacco industry PACs.37 Wright includes party affiliation
and ideology because he posits a correlation between a congressperson's support for
the tobacco industry and which side of the aisle they are on, given that parties form
voting coalitions and that parties have subgroups ofmore liberal and more
conservative members, respectively. He includes tobacco production, tobacco
employment, and campaign contributions in order to see whether factors that might
37 Wright, John. "Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting on Tobacco Policy, 1980-2000."
Business and Politics 6:3 (2004). 12 Feb. 2005. Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004.
<http://www.bpress.com/bap>
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affect a congressperson's domestic or monetary campaign support affect their voting
habits-the theory being that representatives from districts where a hit against the
tobacco industry could hurt employment or tobacco revenue in their area may be less
likely to vote against the industry. In some regressions, Wright also includes a
variable for whether or not the votes occurred during the Clinton presidency,
supposing that white house pressure to vote against the industry might affect voting
outcomes. This study also does analyses of pooled and per-vote data, which are
logical potential exploration tracks for our study as well. Our study makes similar
use ofthe party variable, and also relies on the probit qualitative response model.
Garrett and Sobel conduct a study ofFederal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) disaster relief payments in relation to "private insurance disaster
expenditures in state i in year t (including the observations with values ofzero) on
private insurance disaster payments, Red Cross Disaster assistance, the number of
FEMA disasters declared, regional and year dummies, and oversight subcommittee
variables," among others.38 Garrett and Sobel's inclusion ofoversight subcommittee
variables is intriguing, given their explanations for why those variables were included
in their regressions. While it is possible that FEMA disaster expenditures are solely a
function of the magnitude ofa given disaster in the United States, they contend that it
also may be possible that congressional influence significantly contributes to FEMA
relief awards. By researching which house and senate subcommittees had oversight
over FEMA payments and including a dummy for whether or not congresspersons
38 Garrett, Thomas A. and Sobel, Russell S. "The Political Economy ofFEMA Disaster Payments."
Economic Inquiry 41:3 (2003). 496-509.
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were members of those committees, they were able to explore a possible connections
between committee membership and the magnitude ofFEMA relief
Given that the Senate Armed Services committee is responsible for holding
hearings about BMD programs and directly overseeing the effort, membership on this
committee seems like a useful variable to include in our regressions. Membership on
the committee may mean that those Senators who have committee standing are the
best informed about BMD policy, being the politicians who directly interface with the
military personnel who are responsible for administering its development. This may
mean that members are likely to be less supportive of funding the program without
successful tests or adequate testing, or increasing BMD program funding without
seeing sufficient evidence that its goals are technologically feasible. Contrarily, the
Armed Services Committee may be more likely to fund military projects in general
because they are closer to them and more often updated. It is also possible that if the
Armed Services Committee members have better connections to DOD officials they
may be more aware ofa general criticism (revealed in Wilson's interviews with top
level officials from many military branches) that MDA funding is a drain from other,
more worthy programs. In this case, Armed Services Committee members may be
less likely so support BMD programs, in general. In any event, the armed services
committee variable presents itself as a compelling factor for inclusion.
In a study similar to that of Garret and Sobel, Rawls and Laband analyze
whether or not the amount of endangered species listings in a congressional district is
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subject to political maneuvering by members ofcongress.39 In this paper, Rawls and
Laband use a League ofConservation Voters' "scorecard" which ranks each
congressperson's support for conservation on a scale of 1-100. Our study uses a
similar "DW-NOMINATE" score developed by Poole and Rosenthal, which asses a
member's political ideology on a scale from -1-1 along a normal distribution curve.
Rather than being based on rhetorically devised ideology, the Poole-Rosenthal scores
calculate special distances in role-call data that align congress members along an axis
based on the frequency with which they vote ''yea'' or "nay" compared to all other
members. The DW-NOMINATE scores will be further elaborated in Data, Section
IV ofthis thesis, but in theory the DW-NOMINATE scores track how similarly
congress people vote when compared to one another, and plot them along a statistical
distribution. Going beyond a simple du:mmy variable for political party, the nominate
scores should help isolate the role that ideology plays (if any) in supporting or
constraining missile defense efforts.
In a 1970 study, James Clotfelter analyzes the influence of military prime
contract awards (contracts directly awarded by the Federal government), the state
percentage of the population on the Defense Department payroll, and state civilian
defense employment as a percentage of total civilian state workforce to analyze
whether the intensity of the presence ofthe military-industrial complex presents in a
state influenced Senators' voting behavior on 11 key defense-related roll call votes in
39 Rawls, R. Patrick and Laband, David N. "A Public Choice Analysis ofEndangered Species Listings."
Public Choice 121: 263-277, 2004.
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1969.40 Using zero-order coefficients between roll-call scores and each variable,
Clotfelter fmds that the prime contract variable had the weakest correlation with the
roll-call voting behavior, and further that the relationship was not significant at the
0.05 level. He also fmds that while the prime-contract variable has a weak correlation
with roll-call behavior, the amount ofDOD employment within each state had
significant effects at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, meaning that there was an extremely
strong correlation between DOD employment and voting behavior on defense issues.
In a more recent study, Derouen and Heo use prime contracts to analyze the
relationship between domestic politics and defense spending, albeit on a macro level
that relates GDP patterns to presidential manipulations ofthe national defense
budget.41 To see ifpatterns like the ones Clotfelter observed hold true in 2004,
information on both prime contracts and the amount ofpersons employed by the
military in a given state are included in our data set.
III. RESEARCH DESIGN
In its simplest form, a "regression" calculation studies the correlative relationship
between two factors. The simplest two-dimensional graphs use this concept where a
movement on the x axis corresponds to a movement on the y axis. Any plotting ofan
(x,y) coordinate gives us a point that possibly expresses the relationship between the
measurements on the x and y axes. This relationship can be as simple as the notation
ofa decision made at a single moment in time. A correlation can be explained as
40 Clotfelter, James. "Senate Voting and Constituency Stake in Defense Spending." The Journal of
Politics. 32:4 (Nov., 1970) 979-983.
41 Derouen, Karl Jr., Reo, Uk. "Defense Contracting and Domestic Politics." Political Research
Quarterly. 53:4 (Dec., 2000) 753-769.
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evidence ofa particular theory, but in and of itself it does not prove causal
relationships between phenomena. For example, say we have two planes, hamburgers
(x) and soda (y). We can posit that our x axis is causal because hamburgers make one
hungry, and thus hamburgers correspond to a dependent value on the y axis. In this
example, hamburgers cause thirst at a rate of 1: 1. If one orders two hamburgers, then,
they will also order two sodas-and we can plot the point (2,2) on our plane.
Because a one-unit increase in hamburgers corresponds to a one-unit increase in
sodas, points in our example would be linked by a line with a slope having a positive
value of 1 (in this example, we are also ignoring fact that our customer probably does
not have an infmite capacity for ingesting soda and hamburgers). Putting this
example into a simple algebraic equation, we can us ay=mx+b form to express our
possible relationship as
Sj=1(HJ
Where Sj is the expected number of sodas for observation i, 1 represents the slope and
1:1 ratio of soda to hamburger orders, and lL represents the number of hamburgers
ordered.
This is the basic idea behind the simplest forms of regression analysis-that an
event like soda ordering might be explained by a possible causal factor, like the
number of hamburgers demanded in that same order. Thus, given a particular
phenomenon, we are able to model events as the result ofone or more factors. A
person's salary, for example, may be the result of their education, the number ofyears
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they have spent in the workforce, and the area of the country that they live in. The
price ofa car may be a function of its mileage, automaker, and age. Regression
analyses simply give us a coherent way to look at how a multitude ofvariables and
possible causal relationships may affect a particular outcome, rather than just one.
The simplest regression technique is the Ordinary Least Squares model (OLS),
which takes the form
~=/31+/32X+Uj
Where /32 is the amount that a one-unit change in a given observation X will affect
the given outcome Yi, /31 is a constant number that is not dependent onX or Yi, and Uj
is a stochastic (random) error term. An error term is included here because we know
that while in theory it is possible to explain any event in terms of its hypothesized
causal factors, in practice a perfect description is very difficult. In a perfect model, Uj
would have a value ofzero, because our explanation of a Yi event would have no
errors and would be perfectly explained. In practice, experimental error terms are not
zero, and smaller error terms are generally assumed to be indicative ofbetter models.
Finally, the portion of Yi that is explained by given variables is called the R2 value,
which is "a summary measure that tells how well the sample regression line fits the
data". The higher a regression's R2 value, the better the model explains the variation
in the left-hand side variable.
Before we move on from the OLS regression format, however, let's briefly touch
on how one would interpret the results ofone of these regressions. Using a made-up
example it is easy to see how OLS could actually help us describe something
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practical, like the price ofa car. Let's use the following model to describe the present
value ofa car that sold for $20,000.00 when it was new:
Pcar=20,000-2Mile-lOOOAge+ Uj
Here Pcar is the price ofthe car, 20,000 is a constant term (in dollars), Mile is the
number of miles a given car has on its odometer, Age is the car's age, and Uj is the
error term. The values 2 and 1000 represent the change in the price ofa car due to a
one unit change in mileage (an additional mile) or a one-unit change in age (an
additional year). Our model predicts that a new car's price will be $20,000.00, and
that each additional mile decreases the price ofour car by $2.00, while every
additional year of its lifespan will decrease its value by $1000.00. Since not all
variation in used car values can be explained by mileage and age alone, Uj stands in
for all ofthe factors that collectively would help to explain how car value changes,
but that are not included in our model.
The sample OLS regression we have used above explains a quantitative change as
the result ofother quantitative changes. But what ifwe want to add a qualitative
factor into our calculations, like whether the car is or is not a Toyota? A car either
must or must not be recognized as a Toyota model, and therefore a variable for brand
in our model must be qualitative. Qualitative variables are called "dummy variables"
in regression analysis, and simply take the value of zero or one depending on whether
the observed characteristic is present. Let's look at our example again, this time with
a dummy variable representing whether the car is or is not a Toyota:
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p car =20,000-2Mile-l OOOAge+1500Toyota+ Ui
In this regression, the coefficient on Mile still means that a one mile increase will
decrease a car's value by $2.00, and that an additional year ofage will decrease its
value by $1000.00. As we have said, the dummy for car brand will either take the
value ofzero or one--in this case, 0 if the car is not a Toyota, and 1 if it is. This
means that our third term will express one of two possibilities, taking the form
+1500(0) or +1500(1). This means that if the value of the brand variable is 0 and the
car is not a Toyota, there will be no change in the car's price. If the car is a Toyota
then the term will read +1500(1), and the value of Pcar will be increased by
$1,500.00.
Given that brief review ofOLS regression analysis, we can now move on to the
specific form we will use to model the increased probability ofa senator favorably
voting to support BMD legislation. The primary distinction between the above
regressions and our own will be that our left-hand side, dependent variable will be
qualitative rather than quantitative. Because our dependent outcome will be either a
favorable "aye", or an unfavorable "nay" vote, the left-hand side variable will
actually be a dummy which takes a value ofeither 0 or 1. In more technical terms,
we must select a "qualitative response" regression model.
OLS done with a qualitative result as the dependent variable is called the Linear






this model. Unfortunately, however, using OLS to predict probabilities is
problematic for the following reasons:42
Non-normality of the disturbances Ui
Heteroscedastic variances ofthe disturbances
Non-fulfillment of0 ~ E(Yi IXi) 2: I
Questionable value ofR2 as a goodness of fit
While it is not necessary to go into great detail about why the preceding four
conditions are problematic, briefly touching on them will be important to our
understanding ofwhy a different model will be more appropriate for our purposes.
The first condition means that any error terms Ui from our models will not be
statistically "normally" distributed. Since we are often reliant on the properties of the
normal distribution for statistical inference, this could be problematic in modeling
accuracy.
Heteroscedastic variance of the disturbances means that the magnitude of the
error term could change as the inputs to our model change. In our previous
hamburger example, this would mean that predicting the relationship between
hamburgers and sodas could be less accurate the more hamburgers we ordered, or
vice versa. Clearly, inconsistent expectations ofaccuracy could seriously undermine
our confidence in our calculations. OLS assumes that the extent ofa regression error
term will not vary as data varies (homoscedasticity), and that the rate oferror in a
model will be the same no matter what the inputs into the model are. This
42 Gujarati, Damodar N. Basic Econometrics: Fourth Edition. New Deh1i: Tate McGraw-Hill, 2003. 608-
617.
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undermines one of the main tenets that OLS modeling accuracy is contingent upon,
and could be very problematic.
Non-fulfillment of 0 :s E(Yi IX;) ~ 1 means that we cannot be sure that every set of
model inputs will yield a Yi value that is either zero or one. We could end up with
predictions that say that the probability ofan individual getting a certain job are -.06
(-6%), or that the probability of a US Senator delivering a "yes" vote on a particular
bill is 4 (400%)-neither of which make any sense. Thus we must look beyond the
simple LPM to find a modeling form that will yield more interpretively useful results.
After the LPM, the two main types ofqualitative response regression models are
the logit and probit models. These models are similar in that they both allow
researchers predict probabilities by yielding a value between zero and one, given
certain inputs.
In Basic Econometrics, Gujarati explains the motivation behind the probit model
in terms ofcalculating the probability that a family will own a home, given that
family's income. In this home ownership example, we assume that whether or not the
ith family will choose to own a home is dependent on a latent variable, or
unobservable utility index Ii. This unobservable utility index is "determined by one
or more explanatory variables, say income Xi, in such a way that the larger the value
ofthe index Ii, the greater probability ofa family owning a house."
This index Ii can thus be expressed as
Ij= Pi +P2X;
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Here, the variable Xi stands for the income of the ith family. The unobservable
index Ii is related to the decision to own a home because we can assume that there is a
"critical or threshold" level of the index above which the family will choose to own a
house, and below which it will not. This threshold index value can be denoted Ii *.
Again, if a family's index Ii exceeds Ii * they will choose to own a home, whereas if it
is less than Ii* they will not choose to own a home. Though Ii and Ii * are
unobservable, Gujarati further asserts that we can assume that the observations Ii will
relate to Ii * following a normal distribution pattern.
Given the assumption of normality, the probability that Ii * is less than or equal to
Ii can be represented by43
Pi = P(Y = 1 IX) = P(Ii* :s Ii) = P(Zi :S[JI + [J2X) = F(fJI + [J2X)
Where P(Y = 1 IX) is the probability ofan Y event taking a value of 1 given the
value(s) of the X (explanatory) variable(s) and where Zi is the standard normal
distribution variable ( Z ~ N(O,d-)). Our F stands for the standard normal cumulative
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Using the probit model to fit our observations along the normal CDF, we thus
have an estimation method that allows us to predict the probability ofa qualitative




ofour right hand-side variables, we simply have to take the derivative ofa dependent
variable with respect to an independent variable. An application ofthis in our study
may mean deriving the rate of change ofprobability of a supportive vote with respect
to the amount of prime contracts in a state. That derivative equation would take the
form
(dPJ dXi)=fifh +fh~) fh
Where fif3J + fh ~) fh is the value ofthe normal CDF at fiI +fh~. The
probability calculations we assess later are arrived at using this formula.
IV: DATA
Based on the aforementioned literature review and the hypotheses that
economists, political scientists, and politicians have put forth postulating possible
factors for congressional support of missile defense programs, we will use the
following variables in our calculations:
Dependent Variables:
Three Key Votes. To test congressional voting behavior on missile defense bills as
a function ofa series of factors, we will use three key senate votes from 2004: Senate
Vote 124 on July 17th, 2004, Senate Vote 125 on July 1ih, 2004, and Senate Vote 139
on July 23,2004. All of these bills were votes which moved to constrain or bolster
missile defense funding, and refer specifically to that weapons program. This is
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important, because a general summary ofvotes on a variety ofdefense bills would not
allow us to test for ideology or pull factors affecting missile defense programs
specifically.
Senate vote 124 was a proposal by California Senator Barbara Boxer to amend
Senator John W. Warner's (R-VA) National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005 by stipulating that the bill "allow deployment of the ground-based
midcourse defense element ofthe national ballistic missile defense system only after
the mission-related capabilities of the system have been confirmed by operationally
realistic testing.,,45 Lexis-Nexis Congressional describes the original Warner bill as a
general proposal to "authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2005 for military
activities of the Department ofDefense, for military construction, and for defense
activities ofthe Department ofEnergy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal
year for the Armed Services, and for other purposes." Thus, the Boxer amendment
pointedly caused a specific vote to occur with the intention of constraining some
missile defense program funding, by attempting to apply more stringent criteria to the
bill than currently existed. The Boxer amendment was rejected 42-57, and the party
breakdown ofeach bill is illustrated in Table 1.1 below.
Senate vote 125 was a roll-call vote on John Warner's Amendment 3543 "to
require the Secretary ofDefense to prescribe and apply criteria for operationally
realistic testing of fieldable prototypes developed under the ballistic missile defense




spiral development program.,,46 This was an amendment to amend Senator Reed's
(D-Rl) Amendment No.3354, which followed the vote on the Boxer amendment, and
aimed to require "baselines for and testing ofblock configuration ofthe Ballistic
Missile Defense system." Unlike the Boxer amendment, the Warner amendment did
pass by a vote of55 yeas to 44 nays. This is likely because the language is looser
than that ofthe Boxer amendment, but because it still required more BMD program
constraint than any language that was previously stipulated by the senate, it represents
a movement towards constraining BMD funding. We should note here that most
Democrats which voted for the Boxer amendment voted against this Warner
amendment, perhaps because it was viewed as a weaker statement ofBMD constraint
the most Democratic senators would have liked.
On Senate vote 139, "The Senate rejected Reed Amendment No. 3353, to limit
the obligation and expenditure offunds for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
program pending the submission ofa report on operational test and evaluation.,,47
This bill offered the most stringent constraint on BMD programs, because while the
Boxer amendment only aimed to limit deployment, this new Reed amendment
addressed funding constraints directly. The amendment ultimately failed to pass,
though it enjoyed somewhat higher democratic support than did the Boxer
amendment. This could be because Democrats who had initially voted against the
Boxer amendment had originally thought that the Boxer amendment's wording was
46 Lexis-Nexis Congressional. 13 Dec. 2005. 2004 Congressional Information Service, inc. 24 June 2004.
< http://O-web.lexis-nexis.com.janus.uoregon.edu/congcomp/document?_ m=8aa9676b2095ed2d4cdO
caf4f335aa42& docnum=4&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkSA& md5=le8ebeOa8738714e78f201a692a3462b>




too strong, but after the passage ofthe Warner amendment they were dissatisfied with
Warner's Republican response and wanted to show more robust party support for
Reed's second, more constraining amendment.
Table 4.1: Voting Breakdown on Senate Bills 124,125, and 139, June 2004
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To summarize the general outcomes of all three votes, figure 1.2 shows the
amount ofpro and anti-constraint votes for each BMD floor vote.
Figure 4.2: Graphical Representation of Floor Votes
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Votes to Constrain BMD Efforts
While these three votes are good choices for study because they directly address
BMD support, it may be that the interrelated nature of each will be problematic when
we move to do regressions on them. Because the vote on 125 was a Republican
response to the failed Democratic 124 amendment, the vote on 125 may reveal
partisanship over any other correlations. Similarly, because 139 was a reaction to
125, we would expect the same sort of polarization. Though attaining it is beyond the
scope of this paper, our ideal dataset would include information on many more votes
in both the House and Senate, to mitigate the complications that might arise from
interrelated votes like the three we have chosen.
Independent Variables
43
DW-NOMINATE Scores. The "nominate" scores are values that political
scientists Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal developed that calculate a legislator's
tendency toward liberalism (supporting government intervention in the economy and
social institutions) or conservatism (voting in opposition to government intervention),
tying these values to a normal CDF. Most scores lie between +1 and -1, with the
more positive numbers being conservative and the more negative numbers being
more liberal. As noted earlier, Poole describes the coefficients as an ordering
between the spatial relationships between different senators' voting patterns. Because
Senator Barbara Boxer votes more similarly to Senator Ted Kennedy they have scores
that are -0.601 and -0.566, respectively, along the normal distribution ordering of
Senators. Senators Brownback and McConnell also vote similarly, and have
calculated scores of 0.457 and 0.473, meaning that they are roughly the same distance
from the center and that their voting patterns are seldom different. The correlation
coefficient between DW-NOMINATE and PARTY variables is 0.8791-meaning
that party is closely tied to the Poole-Rosenthal distribution of ideology, but that it is
not a perfect fit. We use the DW-NOMINATE scores here in place ofparty, hoping to
get a better model of the relationship between liberal-conservative ideology and
support for BMD funding.
State Prime Contract Awards. In testing whether or not the amount ofprime
defense contracts awarded in a given state has an effect on the defense-related voting
behavior of its senator, it is essential to include the aggregate amount of prime
contracts awarded to each state in the fiscal year 2004 as a variable on our model.48
48 Bureau of Economic Analysis. Dec 20 2005. <www.bea.gov>
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While Clotfelter found that the relationship between prime contracts and voting
behavior in his era was weak, it may be that this correlation has changed in recent
decades due to the proliferation ofspecial-interest lobbying on the hill. Prime
contracts may be economic boons to a Senator's state, and Senators from states that
receive large prime contracts may be used to considering defense programs as an
integral part of their state's economy. Therefore, Senators from states with large
general prime contract awards may be less likely to vote against specific programs
(like BMD), because they know what kind of money those contracts bring into the
state.
On the other hand, it may be the case that state prime contracts might have an
effect on voting behavior but that this effect will not be visible in our data, because
influence can be manifested in pork-barrel projects and horse-trading efforts between
senators that would not be explicitly explained by our method ofanalysis. In any
case, it will be necessary to test whether aggregate state prime contracts are a
significant factor in voting to support or constrain existing BMD programs.
BMD Prime Contract Awards. As a corollary to the logic above, it may be that
legislators align their voting behavior in support of specific programs that are funded
well in their state, rather than responding to the total amount ofprime state contracts.
Senators from states with contractors that receive large sums of money from
components of the BMD program may be less likely to vote to constrain or kill such a
program, regardless of its strategic uses. Accordingly, I've used Department of
Defense information listing the number and value ofprime contracts awarded per
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weapons system per state to create variable for the aggregate amount ofBMD (BMD
only) contract dollars for each state.49
Senate Armed Service Committee. As illustrated by the previously mentioned
study concerning committee membership and FEMA disaster relief allocations, it is
possible that whether or not a senator is a member ofthe Senate Armed Services
Committee will have an impact on their voting behavior for particular weapons
programs. While the Senate as a whole can present amendments while voting for the
fmal budget, the Armed Service Committee members are the ones responsible for
deeper oversight ofdefense programs and who presumably have more interface with
members ofthe armed services. Additionally, membership on the Armed Services
Committee may be somewhat self-selecting-Senators who may be inherently more
pro-defense or inclined to support defense programs may be more likely to get on the
committee because armed service funding is a strong interest oftheirs. Membership
could also be contrapuntally self-selecting, with those senators that most want to
check defense spending and oversee defense budgets more inclined to join the
Committee. While it is possible that Armed Service Committee members may be
more critical ofBMD programs and vote to constrain its funding, it is logical to
suspect that committee members may be less critical ofthis large defense program,
due to their close interactions with the DOD and propensity to support the armed
services in general
49 United States Department ofDefense: Directorate for Information Operations and Reports. DOD
Personnel and Procurement. 18 Jan. 2005. <http://web1.whs.miVPEIDHOME/PROCSTAT/st08\ST08-
FY2003.pdf.>
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Percent Population in the Armed Services. This variable is similar to the one
Clotfelter used in his 1970 study, and was calculated by dividing Current Population
Survey numbers of the amount of military personnel living in a given state by that
state's total population. The idea behind the inclusion of this variable is that senators
that come from states with large military populations may be more susceptible to
negative support if they vote against key defense projects and are seen as anti-
military. In theory, these Senators would come from states with larger voting blocks
that pay attention to their support of the defense industry, and they may be hurt more
on election day if they support killing or terminating defense projects in their own
state. Also, ifending a particular military project will result in job losses within a
state, canceling such programs could be seen as "putting people out ofwork", which
again could have serious political consequences.
It should be noted, however, that because BMD is largely a high-tech program
which is manifested in billions of dollars for research and development being spread
across relatively few specialists and support personnel, it is unlikely that job loss
concerns would affect a senator's popularity in the way that canceling or curbing in-
state programs that hired more people might. Nevertheless, because this was one of
Clotfelter's strongest correlations, it is logical to include so that we can see whether
or not the amount ofDOD employees in a given state has any influence on voting
behavior towards BMD specific bills.50
50 United States Current Population Survey. A Joint Project Between the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the
Bureau of the Census: Current Population Survey. 20 Dec. 2005.
<http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/cpsmain.hOO>
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Appendix II contains summary statistics for all ofthe variables used in our
regressions. While these are the primary variables used in our regression analysis, a
great deal more information was collected for the purposes ofthis project. Appendix
III includes a table of information about additional variables, data, and sources used
in the development ofthis paper.
v. EMPIRICAL MODELS:
Given both the dependent and independent variables chosen, the following two
models will each be used in probit regressions for all three 2004 votes. While they
are essentially the same, the former is meant to capture any effects aggregate state
prime contracts may have on legislators' behavior, while the second is mean to isolate
the effect BMD contracts in particular may have.









Table 6.1: Senate Vote 124
Variable Model I Model II







































*significant at the 0.05 level, one-tailed.




As shown by Table 5.1, the DW-NOMINATE scores and membership on the
Senate Armed Service committee both have significant impacts on the outcome of
senate vote 124. DW-NOMINATE is significant at the 0.01 level, while
membership on the Senate Armed Services Committee is significant at the 0.05 level.
This is an interesting result because vote 124 is ostensibly the least partisan, with
more democrats voting towards "I" and against constraining BMD programs than in
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any other 2004 floor vote. The DW-NOMINATE coefficient suggests that for every
one-unit change in a legislator's DW-NOMINATE score, the likelihood that they will
vote against constraining BMD programs increases by about 1.3%. (?) Additionally,
membership on the Armed Service Committee increased the probability that a
Senator would vote against constraints and towards "1" by .2%. This real effect may
be due to the fact that membership on the Senate Armed Service Committee is
somewhat self-selecting, and that committee members are more likely to support
DOD efforts and reject military constraints in general.
The percentage ofa state's population that is employed by the DOD also had no
significant effect on the voting behavior of its Senators in this instance-and the
coefficient is actually negative. As we earlier suspected might have been the case,
this insignificance could be because BMD programs tend to employ people in the
high-tech, strategic-analytic sectors ofthe state economy, and not blue-collar
workers-meaning thatBMD programs may not have the politically positive job-
creation effects that other defense programs may create in a state.
This also ties into the sentiment that was revealed during the Wilson interviews of
high level officers in each of the service branches, that pro-BMD does not have much
ofa correlation with being pro-military. Wilson's interviews, in fact, seemed to
reveal the opposite dynamic: While each officer advocated that their branch needed
more spending money in order for their organizations to optimally function, no high-
ranking officials claimed that their branch needed more funding for BMD
components or that MDA should be better funded. In general, it may be that the
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relationship between state military population and BMD support is unusual because
in this case it does not seem to yield a pro-defense program attitude.
Alternatively, it may be that the dynamic between Senators and the amount of
military personnel in their state has changed since Clotfelter's day, and that the
number ofpeople employed by the DOD no longer has a substantial on voting
behavior in general.
Both ofthe prime contract variables are not statistically significant, meaning that
we are unable to support claims that state prime contract awards in general or
weapons system-specific contracts have a substantial effect on the way a Senator
supports or constrains existing BMD programs. This goes against claims that pork-
barrel spending on BMD programs acutely influences Senators' voting behavior.
However, this does not necessarily mean that such claims ofpork-barrel influence do
not have merit-as suggested with the introduction of the variable, it may be that
because of favor-trading between senators, the prime contract influence does not
explicitly appear in our data analysis.
Table 6.2: Senate Vote 125
Model I Model II



































*significant at the 0.05 level, one-tailed.










For Senate vote 125, the only significant coefficient is the DW-NOMINATE
scores. Like vote 124, the armed service population and prime contract variables
were not significant, and in this case the Armed Services Committee variable was not
significant either. While initially the negative coefficient on the DW-NOMINATE
regressor may seem a bit odd, it makes a great deal of sense once we take into
account the context of this bill, mentioned earlier in section IV. This bill was a
response to the amendment Senator Reed's (D-RI) amendment following the failed
Boxer amendment, which once again sought to constrain the funding flow for BMD
programs. Senator Warner's (R-VA) amendment served as the Republican response
to Reed's Democratic initiative, which presumably most Democrats were dissatisfied
with, given the partisan outcome ofthe vote. The fact that votes 125 and 139 came
quickly after 124 may mean that 125 and 139 are extremely skewed because they
both appear to be partisan responses in the wake of the failed vote on amendment
124. We will nevertheless analyze them for interesting or telling patterns, bearing in
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mind that a larger sample ofBMD votes over time may be a logical way to eventually
extend this study and mitigate the effect ofreactive partisanship between votes.
Only four democratic senators voted for this weaker version of the bill. Because
the DW-NOMINATE scores are correlated with party at a zero-order coefficient of
about 0.8, it is not surprising that the Republicans' fully backing their weaker bill
shows that higher NOMINATE scores push legislators toward BMD constraint in this
example, rather than supporting or expanding BMD programs and moving towards
"1". Again, this vote is probably indicative ofa moment ofpartisan battling within
the US Senate, rather than being a data pool that we can use to try to isolate the
effects ofparty on voting behavior.
Table 6.3: Senate Vote 139
Model I Model II









































*significant at the 0.05 level, one-tailed.





Our last set of regressions again shows a positive relationship between laissez-
faire support ofBMD funding (voting against constraints) and DW-NOMINATE
scores, as well as a positive relationship between membership on the Senate Armed
Service Committee and supportive voting behavior. Like the sets of regressions
before it, we can again see no significant relationship between aggregate state defense
contracts, a state's BMD system prime contracts, the percent ofa state's population
employed by the DOD, and the voting behavior ofa given state's senator on bills
concerning BMD systems. Again, this seems to show that DW-NOMINATE scores
rather than variables like prime contract awards affected Senate support for BMD
systems in 2004.
Because ofthe partisan nature of these three sets of votes, it is prudent to look at
the profiles ofwhich Senators changed their votes from 124-139. If the effects of
defense spending or BMD spending in a state really did influence the votes of some
senators, we might presume that those effects might have been masked in the latter
two votes as differences seemed to be more partisan and the votes were further
indicative of a power struggle. Ifvote 124 was the least partisan, then, vote 139 was
the most so. Looking at the senators who initially voted against their party on 124
and then later voted along partisan lines on 139 yielded some interesting results,
provided in the table below:
Ii
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Table 6.4: Partisan Dissenters, Votes 124 and 139
Senaror Party With Party l!Uwort With Party ~ Dtteose !Above IIMDPrime IAbove Senate
SV124 SV139 Spending in Slate ~ 0Jntn0cts Median ASC
Ounpbell, B (CO) D NJ !'to NJ ~ $2,488,211,000 Yes $1Z7,158,02S.oo Yes NJ
liebennan, J (CI) D NJ !'to NJ IPto $8,064,m,ooo Yes $371,175.00 ~ Yes
Ndson, B (Fl.) D IN> !'to Yes IAtri $8,100,005,000 Yes $21,295,61200 Yes Yes
Ndson, B (NE) D NJ Pro Yes IAnIi $315,300,000 NJ :00 ~ Yes
lJmdrieu, M(LA) D N> !'to Yes IArf:i $1,914,200,000 Yes sm,974.oo IN> NJ
lautrnb<rg, F (NJ) D ~ !'to Yes IArf:i $3,i92,5211,000 Yes $33,813,530.00 Yes NJ
Ointon, H(NY) D NJ !'to Yes IAnIi ~,319,5fI),000 Yes $3,ffi6,2%.00 Yes Yes
KlJIj, H(WI) D NJ !'to Yes IAnIi $1,271,145,000 NJ $3,429.00 NJ NJ
Bremx, J (lA) R NJ AlIi NJ ADi $1,914,n,000 Yes S"m,974.oo NJ NJ
l!Uowe, 0 (ME) R ~ Anti Yes !'to $1,184274,000 NJ ~,071,675.oo Yes ~
Interestingly, four ofthe democratic senators who voted pro-BMD were members
of the Senate Armed Services Committee. With the exclusion of Senator Lieberman
(CT) (who consistently voted pro-BMD), the three senators who voted against their
party in the vote on amendment 124 and then came back into party lockstep for the
vote on amendment 139 were also members of the Committee. These senators were
Senator Nelson ofFlorida, Senator Nelson ofNebraska, and Senator Hillary Clinton
(NY). Ifnot coincidental, this may be indicative ofCommittee members being more
likely to support BMD systems than their colleagues who are not on the Armed
Services Committee. These specific results explain the general trend uncovered in
the regression for amendment 124, where membership on the Armed Services
Committee was a significant indicator ofthe likelihood a particular Senator would
vote to support BMD programs, controlling for other factors. Some brieftheories
about why this occurred will be presented at the conclusion of this paper.
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With the exception of Senators Kohl and Nelson (NE), every democrat who voted
against the general trend of the party enjoyed aggregate state defense spending and
specific, BMD program spending that was higher than the median for either variable.
The median amount of aggregate state prime contract awards was $1,906,374,500.00,
while the aggregate amount ofBMD prime contract awards was $1,604,586.00. Of
the seven democrats who voted against party lines in the first vote, 4 had BMD
contract awards in their states that far exceeded the median amount ofcontract
awards. While these observations do not necessarily imply that senators with
substantial BMD awards well above the median amount were swayed by economic
considerations to initially cross party lines in the vote on amendment 124, this could
be a revealed correlation between BMD contracts and BMD support. The fact that
several ofthese senators were from states that received such high levels ofBMD
contract dollars could merit more study into whether prime contract funding seems
correlated with these senators' voting habits on other cases.
Ofthe two dissenting Republicans, the aggregate state spending levels and BMD
prime contract awards seem to fall short ofexplaining the story of their voting
choices. Senator Snowe's (ME) state represented nearly four times more than then
median in BMD prime contract awards, and she appears to have voted anti-BMD
support in the first vote and then to have voted along party lines in a pro-BMD
manner for the vote on amendment 139. Senator Breaux's state ofLouisiana was
well above the median in aggregate defense prime contract awards but below the
median in BMD prime contracts, and he consistently voted against BMD systems. It
is also interesting to note that he voted with the other Louisiana Senator Mary
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Landrieu on the amendment 139 vote. This could be completely coincidental, or
indicative of some bipartisan efforts between them.
VII: CONCLUSION
Because none ofour regressions found any statistically significant relationship
between aggregate weapons-system specific or general state prime contracts, there is
no evidence in our sample that suggests that pork-barrel considerations have been one
of the major factors leading to Senate support for missile defense spending and
projects. Another way to test for pork-barrel behavior would have been to compile a
list of the prime contractors working on BMD system components, and track their
campaign contributions to Senate candidates. That, unfortunately, was outside the
time-constraint of this undergraduate study, but this is a methodological addition I
would defmitely add to the expansion of this study.
It would be interesting to study whether this same pattern holds true for the House
ofRepresentatives-whose members may be more susceptible to job losses within
their districts because they must be re-elected every two years, and who may be more
sensitive to campaign or other moneyed defense-industry interests because ofan
always-immediate need for campaign funding. Accordingly, a second
methodological change I would make in further study would be to compile a larger
sample ofHouse votes on the BMD issue. Our regression study of the three 2004
votes did not lend any evidence to the theory that Senators vote towards supporting
BMD based on the amount ofprime contracts the weapons system may bring to their
state, although analyzing specific senator profiles did reveal that three ofthe
f ---------
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sixDemocrats who initially defected from their party's position in vote 124 had BMD
contracts flowing into their state far above the median amount.
Not surprisingly, the DW-NOMINATE measure ofpolitical ideology played a
large role in all three votes, and had the largest effects on the outcomes on
amendments 125 and 139. Because the nominate scores have become more correlated
with party in recent Congresses, it is not surprising that the partisan nature ofall three
votes was illustrated by the nominate score variable. The use ofthe scores, however,
did illustrate the importance ofthe Senate Armed Services Committee variable in the
fIrst vote, because the effect was not statistically signifIcant in earlier regressions
where I used a dummy variable for party to measure political ideology. In the
regression on 124, the one instance where any factor but ideology was measurably
important, membership in the Committee became signifIcant in rejecting attempts to
constrain BMD programs. This may lend some support to theories concerning senate
committees, as it may be that the members on the Armed Service Committee are
either generally more favorable toward defense or BMD programs (whether because
ofCommittee membership or experience prior to it), or alternatively, that they are
initially somewhat self-selecting. Because they are more prone to unilaterally or
robustly supporting defense programs initially, the argument goes, they will therefore
be more likely to be a key group against budget constraint. It also may be that the
Senate Armed Service Committee members are less willing to "tie the hands" ofthe
DOD on programs like missile defense because they are more trustful that the
military will spend money wisely because oftheir generally more consistent
interfacing with career military officials. This result could also mean that Committee
..
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members are better informed .about BMD programs and are more often briefed about
their execution, and that they are thus more supportive of BMD programs because
they ideologically believe they are an important part of US national security strategy.
At the outset of this paper I suspected that there would be some relationship
between support for BMD program funding and the amount of prime contracts
awarded in a state, and despite finding some interesting correlations when looking at
profiles of party defectors on vote 124, I did not find measurable evidence of such
influence. There are several reasons why this outcome was not unearthed in this
study, the first being that it is possible that there is really not much relationship
between BMD contracts and Senate voting. As discussed earlier, this could be
because BMD programs spend lots ofmoney but employ relatively few people, and
therefore constraining BMD in one's state does not have the same political impact as
something like a base closing might have. It is also possible the effect of BMD
programs on voting is not directly measurable because ofhorse-trading and behind
the scenes negotiations between senators, which would blur the obvious relationships
between voting behavior and contributions. Finally, if the high level officials Wilson
interviewed are representative of a general attitude in the military towards the MDA,
it may be that BMD is a unique program in that pro-defense ideology does not
correlate with pro-BMD support. Congress members may heed DOD opinion that
BMD is a drain from other, more important parts ofthe armed services that need




As noted earlier, the research I have undertaken thus far could be expanded to a
study of2004 House voting behavior using similar variables and a much larger
number of issue votes (substantially more than three), and this is the ideal
methodological direction for expansion of this study. Ifthere is any correlation
between BMD programs in a region and voting behavior (despite the unusual,
specifically hi-tech nature of the project), one might expect it to be more directly
illustrated in Congress, where members are constantly campaigning and voting
against a local program in a smaller, district area might have a more acute reaction
from a representative's constituency. It might also be useful to apply those same
variables to a series ofvotes during the later years of the Clinton administratio~ to
see if ideology post-September 11 th has lend stronger support for BMD programs, or
if that correlative relationship was stronger before those events. A pre and post-
Clinton era study ofa large number ofHouse votes might also allow us to better
control for the effect of partisanship on voting, which could reveal other important
factors that would be masked by only being able to study a few votes in 2004. For
either of those potential project expansions, this thesis has laid down a solid analysis







































Summary Statistics of Regressed Variables
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Variabl Obs
e v. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DW-
NOMIN
ATE 100 0.00013 0.408665 -0.861 0.643
Prime
Contra $3,790,
ct 000.000 $5,660,00 $76,300,0













Variab1. Type Notl~ Source
Decision on Senate vote 139,23 June 2004.
~Aye" votes y,ere supportive of refusing to
d2004sv139_06_2 fund BMD Vv'ithout significant testing evidence.
3_2004_ Dummy therefore "AYE"::::O. lexis~Nexis Congressional
Decision on Senate vote 124, 17 June 2004.
Aye" votes ¥<ere supportive of refusing to fund
d2004sv124_06_1 SMO ¥t1thout significant testing evidence,
7_2004_ Dummy therefore "AYE"=O. Lexis-Nexis Congressional
Decision on senate Lexis-Nexis Congressional
vote 125. 17 June 2004.
The Senate agreed to
Warner Amendment No.
3453 (to Amendment
No.3354), to require the












d2004sv125_06_1 the BMD program,
7_2004_ Dummy "AYE"=O.
Member Name Last Name. First US Congressional Record
Senate Dummy ·=1 if Senate. 0 if No US Congressional Record
·=1 if Republican, °~
Party Dummy No US Congressional Record
District Reference District Number, if Member of Congress US Congressional Record
State Name State
ADJ>8fSonnel_04 Quantity Number Active Duty Personnel in State in 2004 CPS
Number Civifian Mi~tary Personnel in State in
C_personnel_04 Quantity 2004 CPS
mg_personnel_O Number Reserve and National Guard in State
4 Quantity in 2004 CPS
Total Armed Service personnel in given state.
total_personneL (=Active Duty Milnary +Civilian +Reserve and
04 Quantity National Guard) Generated
amt_prime_contr Total Dollar Amount of Prime Defense
act_swards_04 Quantity Contracts Awanded in Stale SEA
Gross State Product. 2003 (US Bureau of
GSP_03 Quantity Economic Analysis) SEA
Defense Contracts as Percentage of OveraU
percent_GSP_03 Quantity GSP Generated
Calculation of State Population Including
stale_popJncmil Military Personnel
-04 Quantity (=total_personnel_04+stateJlOP_04) Generated
State Population in 2004. from Current
state.Jlop_04 Quantity Population Survey CPS
Percentage of Population in the Armed
percent_populati Services
on_aservice_04 Quantity (=total_personnel_04/state_poP_incmil_04) CPS
bea_gsp_fedmil_ Bureau of Economic Analysis Figures for State
03 Quantity PrOduct From Federal Military Contracts SEA
Defense Contracts as Percentage of Overall
beaJ)ercent_GS GSP. using only SEA Data
P_03 Quantity (=bea_gsp_fedmiL03/GSP_03) Generated
Total Dollar Amount of Prime Defense
prime_conb"'acts_ Contracts From Ballistic Missile Defense
bmd_fy2003 Quantity Projects. FY2003 DOD
The proportion of a given state's total prime
contract awards that is due SMD contracts. in
bmd.Jlrime_contr particular. (= prime_contracts_bmd_fy20031
act_share Quantity amt_defenseJ)rime_contract_award) Generated
Poole-Rosenthal scores for the liberal-
dw_nominate108 conservative tendencies within the 108th
1 Value congress, distributed along a normal CDF. Keith T. Poole. Howard Rosenthal
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